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ARTICLES
DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES TO
ETHNIC CONFLICT:
CONSOCIATIONALISM AND NEO-
SEPARATISM
Charles E. Ehrlich*
I. INTRODUCTION
Before modern society formed, man lived in communities
which were often, to a certain extent, isolated from one anoth-
er. Each community had its own manner of customs, laws, and
social norms. Societies began to interact, and, when they did,
they needed to account for conflicts in legal systems. Where
one society conquered another, the victorious society could
generally impose its legal system. However, the dominant
groups did not always succeed in imposing their identity.
In the modern world, identity has come to play a major
role in political agendas. Where a state has attempted to im-
pose a single identity based on a majority group, it has met
resistance and even has seen the resurgence of previously
ignored cultural groups.' Democracy has further allowed peo-
ple to express their diverse views of the world. As a result,
most states find themselves to be plural societies composed of
divergent - and often contradictory - groups. If they profess to
behave as open and free democracies, they need to find a way
* Legal Counsel, Claims Resolution Tribunal, Zurich, Switzerland. J.D., The
College of William and Mary 1999; D.Phil., The University of Oxford 1995; M.Sc.
Econs., The London School of Economics and Political Science 1992; A.B., Harvard
College 1991.
1. For example, the communist regime in Yugoslavia encouraged cultural
pride and the retention of each group's distinct identity. See JAMES G. KELLAS,
THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISM AND ETNICITY 115 (1991).
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to allow for the diversity of expression without undermining
their own existence. Plural societies need to find a way to
accommodate multiple identities within their state structure,
or risk mass disorder and potential violence.
This article will examine the issue as it exists in a chang-
ing world - one in which the seemingly contradictory trends of
globalization and decentralization are working together to
create new paradigms. It will discuss two non-violent, indeed
democratic, alternatives to potential ethnic conflict:
consociationalism and neo-separatism.2 In a consociational
regime, each cultural group has an official role in the constitu-
tional system which guarantees group rights while preserving
the whole state unit: Belgium, Lebanon, and South Africa are
experimenting with such possibilities. By contrast, the neo-
separatists look to balance growing decentralization and glob-
alization in order to eventually secede, in a de facto manner,
without ever having to declare independence or create a de-
fined rupture. The Catalans, in Spain, are the leaders of this
tendency.
A. Democratic Government and Fundamental Cleavages
The theory of democratic government rests on a simple
premise: a fair system of voting determines a majority which
governs while respecting the rights of the minority.' Contem-
porary democratic regimes take many forms, but most have de-
veloped a system of parties which compete with each other in a
political arena for votes and the right to govern. One concept
remains fundamental to most theorists, however: the party in
the minority can one day become the party in the majority
simply by winning over enough of the electorate.4
Societal cleavages do not always rest on ideologies, howev-
er. Sometimes, party affiliation becomes intertwined with per-
sonal identity. Some elements of identity, often ethno-cultural
in nature, have made an especially indelible mark. Although
all sides may agree on the ideal of democratic government,
they may find such a regime impractical. With party affiliation
2. See generally AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COM-
PARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977).
3. See id. at 21.
4. See id. at 22.
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tied to identity, the minority party cannot hope to persuade the
electorate to favor it because it stands for a representation of
identity not ideology. If identity becomes the real focal point
for politics, it can become exclusive to the point that a domi-
nant majority can oppress minority groups, hardly represent-
ing fair play and democracy as generally understood.5 In the
extreme, pluralism can make democracy untenable, by pitting
one group as the mortal enemy of other groups.6
Society need not be homogenous for democracy to work.
However, in a classic democratic regime, different segments of
society share a civic identity to complement whatever other
individual or group identity they also might have. It is this
shared civic identity which creates regime stability. For stan-
dard democracy to work, even heterogeneous societies must
share a homogeneous civic identity - one group must be willing
to vote for a member of another group because they share
political objectives despite belonging to separate identity
groups. If separate groups feel genuinely constrained to vote
only for candidates from within their own group, then function-
al democracy faces a threat.
For a country to function as a democracy, it does not re-
quire a homogenous population. The different segments of
that population do not even have to interact much with one an-
other. But they do have to respect each other, not interfere
beyond agreed norms, and share a common civic identity or
loyalty to the greater state. One group cannot overwhelm the
other - if a society has two main groups they must be relatively
evenly matched, and if it has more than two groups no one can
become dominant. Finally, the general population of the groups
must place confidence in their leaders to guide society, because
such a democracy only functions day-to-day as a product of its
elites.'
B. Political boundaries and the modern state
Modern democracy emerged from the Age of Enlighten-
ment. So too, however, did other forces of identity. Frontiers
which derived from historical accidents did not correspond with
5. See id. at 22-23.
6. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 254-255 (1989).
7. See KELLAS, supra note 1, at 136-139.
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settlement patterns, as the original modern nation-states of
Europe did not derive their civic identities from their citizens.
To a certain extent, the values of the Enlightenment tried to
force citizens to take a "national" identity defined by the state.
This created a certain amount of backlash from groups who, on
the one hand, had their sense of ethnic identity rekindled and,
on the other hand, felt threatened by the majority nationality
in their state.8 This re-awakened ethnic identity, coupled with
an innovative use of the term "nation" to categorize ethnically-
defined sub groups within Nation-States, marked the begin-
ning of ethnic politics?
Similarly, religion, once a matter of course, became a divi-
sive force around the same time. Religious boundaries, like
ethnic ones, did not necessarily correspond with coalescing
state frontiers. Even where they did, radical secularizing anti-
clericalism created an additional cleavage between the reli-
gious and the a-religious populations, to an extent far greater
than previously felt. The situation increased in importance
because the religious population felt that attacks on organized
religion threatened their identities. This was not merely a case
of a parallel secular civic society and personal religious society;
the anti-clericals presented a very real threat to believers.
None of these forces had been relevant previously, even
where they existed in embryo, because the people did not have
voting power. As democratic ideals spread and more states
adopted democratic regime structures, those which had fewer
cleavages, those which did not have cleavages which ran near-
ly so deep, and those whose minority groups were relatively
insignificant, stood a better chance of forming a stable civic
identity on which to build a democratic government. Where
distinct ethno-cultural identities flourished, rifts developed in
societies and became the focus of politics and governance."
8. See Charles E. Ehrlich, Ethnicity, Citizenship, and Identity in the Constitu-
tion of Multiethnic States: Lessons From Early Twentieth Century Spain and Aus.
tria, in THE EUROPEAN LEGACY 1147-1148 (1997). Cf. Dov RONEN, THE QUEST FOR
SELF-DETERMINATION (1979).
9. See RONEN, supra note 8.
10. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIc GROUPS IN CONFLICT 6-12 (1985).
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II. CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY
Many states which had significant cultural cleavages nev-
ertheless managed to form stable democracies. They did so
through what has been termed by theorists" as the
consociational model. To varying degrees, they institutionalized
their cleavages and used them to build a democratic structure.
Power-sharing mechanisms manifested themselves in several
ways, either based on parties which represented the separate
groups or upon the group identities directly. 2
These issues spread outside the West as democratic ideals
spread. Non-Western states often found their boundaries even
more artificial than European states because most of the non-
Western boundaries came as the result of European colonial
powers carving up territories without regard for the identities
of the people on the ground." Whereas within Western Eu-
rope ethnic conflict has generally become internalized to a poli-
tics of consensus, in newer states politicians have exacerbated
ethnic conflict by highlighting the ethnic basis for the identity
of their political movements. Even when ethnic identity has
played little role in a political movement, politicians have
found it productive to appeal to that sentiment within their
own tribe or religious group. 4 As democratic ideals spread to
the developing world, a look back to Europe could provide
instruction on how to restrain potential ethnic conflict. 5
A. The Seminal Case: The Netherlands
The Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart first coined
the term consociational democracy in order to describe the
political system he observed in the Netherlands in the
1960s. 6 However, the term quickly expanded to include sever-
al similar regimes in various countries with diverse cleavage
11. See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, THE POLITICS OF ACCOMODATION: PLURALISM
AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NETHERLANDS (1968).
12. See id.
13. See Jerome Wilson, Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-Determination, 11
CONN. J. INT'L L. 433, 440-442 (1996).
14. See HOROWITZ, supra note 10, at 291-298.
15. See JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSI-
TION AND CONSOLIDATION 33-37 (1996).
16. Lijphart, supra note 11, at 15.
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systems. 7
Class and religion heavily divide Dutch society. The reli-
gious cleavage runs three ways: besides the split between Cal-
vinists and Catholics, there is also a rift with a secular bloc
which has a strong liberal anti-clerical background. 8 These
rifts date back to the founding of the Dutch state and its inde-
pendence from Spain. More than simple religious affiliations,
the three main groups each feel a fundamental link with the
identity of the country, and the links do not correspond.19
Further complicating these so-called vertical cleavages is
the horizontal cleavage of class. In many societies, the common
struggle of the non-aristocratic classes against the aristocracy
caused the bulk of the population to bond together into con-
temporary democratic states. In the Netherlands, however,
the bourgeoisie governed far earlier than in other countries -
from independence in the seventeenth century - thus attracting
a greater amount of enmity from the working classes than in
other western democracies. °
These cleavages might suggest that democracy would be
unworkable in the Netherlands. What Lijphart tried to explain,
however, was precisely how democracy could function in the
country. The Netherlands adopted as a solution the institution-
alization of these cleavages into the political structure. Rather
than divide society, the diverse strands became interwoven
into a system which, as a whole, comprised a functioning dem-
ocratic society. Each bloc may have its own representation in
society, but also feel a part of Dutch society, and see Dutch
society as the combination of all of their identities.2'
Each sub-group in society has its own political party, its
own interest groups, and its own socihl organizations. This has
led to mutual accommodation, based on each group's accep-
tance of the others as partners instead of as competitors. At
the pinnacle of the system is the Economic and Social Council,
an appointed body made up of representatives of all major
groups which has only nominal real power but great influence.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 16-18.
20. See id. at 18-23.
21. See id. at 78-82.
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The political power rests with elected officials but these too
seek to avoid conflict.22
B. Types of Consociational Democracy
The Dutch system epitomizes the main variety of
consociational democracy. As distinct from the adversarial
politics found in many traditional western democracies such as
the United States or Great Britain, Dutch governance seeks
out broad coalitions even when coalitions are not necessary to
form a majority. The Grand Coalition (a coalition government
which includes two or more large political parties with oppos-
ing viewpoints) carries special importance in a system which
emphasizes the sharing of power over the dominance of any
one group.23 Instead of government versus opposition,
consociational democracies often require the opposition to be
internal to the government; to better sort out differences with-
out public scrutiny or conflict.24
Beyond the Grand Coalition, the philosophy of
consociational democracy rests on as many as three pillars: 1)
mutual veto; 2) proportionality; and 3) segmental autonomy.25
With mutual veto, often called concurrent majority rule, every
group reserves the right to veto legislation which is not in the
interest of their particular group. Therefore, if one group or
even one sub-group finds a policy to be completely detrimental
to its fundamental interests, it may veto that policy even if the
other groups support the policy. This allows all groups a cer-
tain measure of security, knowing that their fundamental
interests cannot fall under grave threat. This veto, however,
can only appear sparingly, at the risk of making government
unworkable. But the power to wield the veto forces even
greater compromise by encouraging participation in the system
and compromise with other groups on anything which might
not be considered quite as essential. The drawback, however, is
potential governmental stalemate.
In dividing up governmental and administrative posts,
22. See id. at 103-181.
23. See LIJPHART, supra note 2, at 25-31.
24. See id. at 25-31.
25. See id. at 33-38.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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consociational democracies often rely on some degree of propor-
tionality. Instead of the majority party making only friendly
appointments, each group would receive a number of posts at
each level of civil society proportional with its relative popula-
tion within society.28 In this way, everyone receives ample
representation at all levels of government, and no accident can
produce anything otherwise. Rather than democratic majority
rule, this system produces proportional representative gover-
nance, and prevents groups from feeling victimized by any
otherwise unfriendly majority. However, such an arrangement
fossilizes proportions, which leads to tension if one group has a
higher birthrate than another. The faster-growing group will
quickly feel under-represented, and the slower-growing group
will soon feel threatened with getting overrun."
Finally, consociational democracies often resort to a cer-
tain amount of segmented autonomy. This can occur in two
ways. First, where the different groups live in distinct geo-
graphic regions of the country, the group which may form a
minority at the state level is permitted autonomy and a degree
of devolved power at the regional level. Second, where the
different groups live in geographically mixed communities or in
a patchwork arrangement, cultural devolution may result.
When the populations are mixed in this way, each group is
allowed a certain amount of control over its own affairs, such
as having separate school systems. In this way, the groups
have fewer areas of direct conflict." This concept has been
described as personal federalism, in contrast to the more stan-
dard territorial federalism. The underlying principle allows
allegiance to a common state despite irreconcilable cleavag-
es.
31
While this is an efficacious system to manage, tensions
which might normally exist between center and periphery as
the result of regional devolution, even without cultural differ-
ences, can quickly dissolve into ethnic conflict. Likewise, re-
28. See id.
29. See LIJPHART, supra note 2, at 38-41.
30. See id. at 41-44.
31. See Antoine Nasri Messarra, Principe de territorialitg et principe de
personnaliti en fiddralisme comparg, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION: CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF
TERRITORIAL DECENTRALIZATION IN FEDERAL AND CENTRALIZED STATES 447-457
(1987).
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gions composed of majority populations might start to resent
the special powers that minority-populated regions might gain.
If the devolution is cultural and not regional, traditions and
rights might receive better protection, but society as a whole
will have to function with different laws applicable to different
elements. This, too, can lead to discord and does little to pro-
mote a stable and common civic society.
Although the theory developed in the Netherlands, the
practice has existed in several countries. Since every country
has its own issues and concerns, they have found divergent
manners of forging consociational democratic systems. Bel-
gium, Lebanon, and South Africa represent three extremely
separate sets of characteristics. These diverse examples show
the range of possibilities for consociational democracy, as well
as the range of potential success or failure. What links these
three examples is that in all three countries the population
feels some strong degree of loyalty to the state. A state civic
identity does indeed exist, independent of the cultural identity,
without which these states might not be at all viable.
C. A Precarious Success: Belgium
Belgium appeared as an accident of history, which resulted
in a portion of the Netherlands and a portion of France uniting
into a single state." Despite its origin as part of the Low
Countries, the French intelligentsia dominated through the
capital city of Brussels. As a result, several non-ethnic cleav-
ages appeared before the Walloon/Fleming one most associated
with contemporary Belgium.3 The first major cleavage ap-
peared between the Catholics and the anti-clericals, under the
influence of a similar division in post-revolutionary France.34
As Belgium industrialized, cleavages of class followed. This, in
turn, led to social movements which cut across the religious
cleavage. The Belgian working class developed social democra-
cy and social Catholicism depending on their religious fer-
vor.35
32. See HANS-DIETER KLINGEMANN ET AL., PARTIES, POLICIES, AND DEMOCRACY
222 (1994).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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Although the Dutch-speaking Flemings outnumbered the
French-speaking Walloons,"6 the predominance of Brussels as
a French city tilted the balance towards the Walloons. Howev-
er, a greater proportion of working class Catholics were Flem-
ish, and so the social Catholic movement began to play the
Flemish card and stress that linguistic and cultural heritage.
Once this happened, the ethno-cultural cleavage took on impor-
tance in Belgian politics. Soon after the social Catholics un-
leashed Flemish nationalism, a party appeared predicated on
that identity. This ultimately provoked a similar movement on
the French-speaking side of the country. 7
All of the major parties split in half. Today, Belgium has
developed a system of party duplication in which every party
has a Flemish and Walloon counterpart.38 These party fami-
lies may or may not join in coalition together. The complexity
of the situation has led to consociationalism in phases.39
One reform which has been discussed for many years, but
never fully developed, is a territorial division of powers. The
natural split of the country into Wallonia and Flanders (the
latter containing small German-speaking and Frisian-speaking
corners) has been hampered by the status of Brussels, a
French-speaking outpost which, in a complete decentralization,
might tilt the power in favor of the minority French speakers,
two regions to one.4"
Belgian politics have ground to a virtual stalemate from
all of the conflicting cleavages.4' However, the country contin-
ues to thrive. A functional professional bureaucracy carries out
the administrative business of the state, not the elected politi-
cians. Belgium thus maintains both the status of a representa-
tive democracy and a functional bureaucratic state. Although
most groups feel under siege, all agree to support the status
quo which provides the stability for what might otherwise turn
into a dysfunctional state.42
36. See id.
37. See id. at 223.
38. See KLINGEMANN ET AL, supra note 33, at 223.
39. See id. at 223-224.
40. See id. at 224.
41. See id. at 224-225, 239.
42. See id.
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D. Consociational Disaster and Rebirth: Lebanon
Achieving independence in 1943, Lebanon existed as an
extremely diverse mix of populations which had no historic
connection or record of self-governance as a group.4" The pop-
ulation was split roughly evenly between Christians and Mos-
lems and each of those two religions was further divided into
sects: Maronite Christians made up 30% of the population,
Sunni Moslems 20%, Shiite Moslems 18%, and Orthodox Chris-
tians 11%." Other sects, and indeed other religious groups
such as the Druze, filled out the population.45
A consociational system developed as an informal pact
between the major groups. Together, they formed a variant of
the Grand Coalition, in which the specific governmental jobs
were partitioned between the groups. The president would
always be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, the chair-
man of the legislature a Shiite, and the deputy chairman and
deputy prime minister an Orthodox Christian.46 Although nor-
mal elections were held, they did not lead to contests between
the sects because the leadership positions were agreed upon
already. Furthermore, the parliamentary constituencies were
multi-member and elected by proportional representation with
a fixed ratio for each sect, a system referred to as "preset pro-
portional representation."47 This further undermined any po-
tential conflict between the sects.4"
Meanwhile, outside politics, each sect had its own schools
and other social infrastructure. This arrangement accounted
for the otherwise geographically mixed populations, allowing
them autonomy without making any one group a minority in
another group's territory.
Lebanon's attempt at consociational democracy did not
work. The inflexible percentages which the diverse groups
agreed on in 1943 did not reflect changing demographics.49
The internal political structure of Lebanon also did not match
the political turmoil of the Middle East, and the international
43. See LIJPHART, supra note 2, at 147-148.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 148.
48. See id.
49. See LIJPHART, supra note 2, at 149-150.
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situation pitted different groups against each other in ways
which would have otherwise not necessarily penetrated inter-
nal Lebanese politics. The failure to cope with the volatile
situation led to a breakdown of the entire system and the
wealthy statelet decayed into civil war by 1975.0
The post-civil war scenario in Lebanon reflects a rebirth of
consociationalism. The original system has been modified to
reflect the current state of affairs, but has been retained to
enough of an extent so as to establish legitimacy in the state.
A new emphasis has been placed on removing some of the
more minor cleavages, such as the sect divisions within each
religion, in order to stabilize the situation. The reshuffling of
percentages now generally reflects the Moslem/Christian split,
rather than the four-way split existing before the civil war.
This has reduced the influence of the Maronites, who had been
the strongest hold-outs against reform because they had held
the most power under the original agreement.5
Since the civil war, the various parties have agreed to
recognize the "Arab" identity of Lebanon." This move was
made not only to appease the Moslems influenced by neighbor-
ing Moslem-Arab states, but also provided a national identity
to which all groups could subscribe. Arab Christians and Arab
Moslems, after all, were still both Arabs.53
The new regime retains the separate administration of
Christian and Moslem populations, each according to its own
custom.54 The current scenario also preserves the old division
of offices among the different sects, but has reshuffled the
portfolios in order to give the Moslems more power. Thus,
certain matters which the Maronite president previously han-
dled have come under the authority of the Sunni prime minis-
ter.55 Currently, seats in parliament are automatically divided
in half between Christians and Moslems. However, most lead-
ers now call for future direct elections which will not be gov-
erned by religious quotas and which will have districts drawn
50. See id. at 148.
51. See RODOLFO STAVENHAGEN, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE NATION-STATE 256
(1996).
52. See id. at 256-257.
53. See id. at 256-257.
54. See id. at 257.
55. See id.
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to include both religions.5
In this way, Lebanon hopes to break down the exclusive
cleavages which produced a ruinous and brutal civil war, with-
out necessarily removing those cleavages altogether. By re-
specting the distinct sects, the system strives to allow them to
determine their own affairs while subscribing to a common
Lebanon. The different groups can thereby maintain their
distinctive identities and belief systems while sharing another
common identity.
E. A New Attempt and Hope: South Africa
Another experiment with consociationalism is in progress
in South Africa. Since the fall of the Apartheid regime, the
constitutional framers have looked for ways to keep together
an extremely diverse population in which, until recently, offi-
cial policy had fostered animosities.
The old Apartheid regime had split different races into
different classes of society.57 Homelands were set up to give
pseudo-independence to black tribes, and to keep them apart
from the whites." Asians and Coloreds also had their own
distinct place in society, which included, in the waning days of
Apartheid, their own parliaments. " The non-white groups did
not have autonomy because they were subservient to the
whites, but the society was kept separate enough so that non-
whites were in many ways self-governing as long as they did
not interfere with white society. This state of affairs provided
the backdrop for the democratic constitutional process set up
after the demise of the Apartheid regime. Since the country
consisted of several racial groups, and even the racial groups
subdivided along ethnic lines (the whites were split between
the Afrikaners and those of British origin, which had created
large differences in identity), consociationalism was the natu-
ral choice for a future democratic regime to take.60
One party, the African National Congress, dominated the
transition, however, and it was not always open to accommoda-
56. See id. at 257-259.
57. See KELLAS, supra note 1, at 126.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 127-129.
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tion even if it paid lip-service to consociational principles in
theory."' The new regime divided South Africa into regions,
with quasi-historical boundaries, in order to pacify ethnic
groups, even within what would become a fundamentally
unitarist state. However, the new boundaries had little historic
legitimacy, and also did not have economic viability. Loyalty
has thus remained with the tribes instead of transferring to
the new regional structures or to other groups within the state
in the spirit of economic cooperation.
The constitutional framers attempted to break the state
down into regions which could manage their own affairs, and
to base those regions on ethnicity so that no group could com-
plain that the new regime was throttling its identity. A certain
amount of veto power would, in theory, produce concurrent
majority rule. In practice, however, the Zulus have shown the
most visible determination to assert their identity and block
the central administration. As a result, the central adminis-
tration has, in turn, centralized further in order to curb the
Zulus. Consociational in theory, the South African Constitution
has not yet followed this theory in practice.
The South African example shows how regional boundaries
can be set up to appease certain ethnic groups, but also how,
when the state itself is fundamentally unitarist in concept,
conflicts will arise which will stir up unnecessary tension be-
tween tribes with distinct historical identities. Specific tribes
may have territorial dominance over specific regions, but the
regions themselves need to have economic and historical viabil-
ity for individuals' loyalty to pass to both the region and the
state. Failing this, the regions become the source, not the solu-
tion, for ethnic conflict.62
In South Africa, the central state created the regions and
gave the regions wide latitude to act - but only within the
structures of the central constitution.63 Although the Consti-
tution establishes regions and gives them powers to act locally,
61. See id. at 142.
62. See David Welsh, The Provincial Boundary Demarcation Process, in BIRTH
OF A CONSTITUTION 223-230 (Bertus de Villiers ed., Rustica Press 1994); Lawrence
Schlemmer, Regionalism in South Africa: Opportunities Missed, in BIRTH OF A
CONSTITUTION 242-255 (Bertus de Villiers ed., Rustica Press 1994).
63. See Bertus de Villiers, The Constitutional Principles: Content and Signif-
icance, in BIRTH OF A CONSTITUTION 45 (Bertus de Villiers ed., Rustica Press
1994).
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much of the real power remains in the center, where the con-
stitution is enforced and interpreted.' Furthermore, only the
central government has the power of taxation, which limits the
real power of the regional governments.65 The concerns of the
Zulus, arguably South Africa's most historic ethnic group, dem-
onstrate fear for the future of their historic identity. The re-
gions in the new South Africa are somewhat historic, even if
not exactly drawn, and delineate ethnic groups. But in some
ways, the unitarist tendencies of the main constitutional fram-
ers sought to include these regions in order to control and
contain ethnic identity. There remains, however, a fundamen-
tal power-play between one important ethnic group which sees
itself as more historically self-governing and the central state.
The Zulus, in their demands for greater privileges, risk produc-
ing a backlash by other groups, which see concessions to the
Zulus as special treatment and who will in turn demand their
own concessions from the central government. The Zulus, or at
least their leaders, understandably do not want to risk losing
their privileged position at the bargaining table with a central
state having unitarist tendencies.66 .
F. The Lessons of Consociationalism
As the world becomes more globalized, the world's citizens
have shown a tendency towards reaffirming their own identi-
ties. How they determine the definition of their identities,
however, remains a very personal matter, even when the defi-
nition comes from demagogues who stir up populations to gain
personal power. But identity must remain a purely personal
and almost indescribable matter. It is not a specific opinion,
which might change, but an aspect of an individual's character
which he shares with a group that he considers too fundamen-
tal to ever change. Ethnic and religious identity meet these
requirements.
States have turned to variants of consociationalism to
integrate their populations. Where a minority group lives in a
geographically definable territory, and where it does not have
64. S. AFR. CONST. Chs. 4, 6, 7, 9 (1993).
65. See Ronald L. Watts, Is the New Constitution Federal or Unitary? in
BIRTH OF A CONSTITUTION 75-88 (Bertus de Villiers ed., Rustica Press 1994).
66. See Wilson, supra note 13, at 442-456.
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sufficient loyalty to the greater state, independentist move-
ments have resulted. States have been able to satisfy some of
these tendencies by ceding certain degrees of autonomy. But in
those states where the population is mixed together, other
models - variants of consociationalism - require consideration.
Social scientists have generally considered
consociationalism an effective way to solve the problems of
conflicting identity within a sovereign territory. Yet in the
three examples presented above, which span the range of pos-
sibilities for consociational democracy, there remains no clear
success. Belgium became almost ungovernable by contempo-
rary democratic standards. The politics of consensus left no one
with any power other than civil service functionaries - hardly
democratically selected representatives, even if appointments
to the civil service reflected the requirements of
consociationalism. To gain political accountability and control,
Belgium has devolved power to its component regions, which
operate almost in a vacuum from one another.67 Although this
would qualify as part of the consociational solution, it hardly
makes Belgium a fully functional single entity. The placement
of the capital of the European Union in the Belgian capital has
further eroded the distinctiveness of "Belgian" as an identity
for Flemings and Walloons.
Meanwhile, in Lebanon, long heralded as a bastion of
functional consociational democracy outside the West, political
instability has dominated the last quarter century - indeed
much of that time was spent fighting a civil war.68
Consociationalism worked to create the new state and kept it
operating for its first three decades of existence, but the sys-
tem was so finely balanced that changes in internal and exter-
nal relationships tipped the scale towards complete breakdown.
This system has been resurrected since the civil war, although
modified slightly to account for changes in that time. However,
the new variant has come under intense international pres-
sure. Furthermore, one of the tenants of the new variant is
that if it works it will phase itself out and ultimately turn
Lebanon into a plural non-consociational society.
The final example, South Africa, has not had time to fully
67. See KLINGEMANN ET AL, supra note 32, at 222.
68. See LIJPHART, supra note 2, at 148.
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develop its new system. However, tension already exists be-
tween the political center and the ethnic periphery. This has
played itself out as a conflict of identity more than anything
else. The governing African National Congress would like to
present itself as the common natural party for all citizens, but
it wants centralized administration and is dominated by a
specific black tribe. If the largest group within the largest
party shows no tendency towards accommodation and instead
seeks power, the other groups might feel sufficiently threat-
ened, seeking to undermine the newly-democratized state
through means which may not be wholly democratic.
In some respects, these countries might learn from non-
consociational, yet still plural, societies like the United States.
A strong civic identity allows diverse groups to keep a common
loyalty. Meanwhile, the government does not seek to impose
any majority identity on minority groups. On the other hand,
the United States has a clear white-European origin. For much
of its history, those who were not white Protestant males were
excluded from power structures within society.69 Even today,
at the start of the twenty-first century, white Protestant males
dominate the elite sectors of society.
This scenario has provoked periodic calls for a more
consociational model in the United States. Whether a black
political movement might form its base - Stokely Carmichael,
the Black Panther leader, once called for such a party to orga-
nize because he felt that until blacks had their own party they
could never gain influence within the existing parties - or
whether simple redistricting to create "minority" districts
would suffice to improve the representation of non-white
groups," these calls echo concerns in societies which have
used consociational models to solve issues of conflicting identi-
ty among citizens.
Fundamentally, then, for a plural state to achieve stabili-
ty, its component groups must maintain a fair degree of civic
loyalty to the amorphous concept of the state itself. Such a
state must not have an ethnic, cultural, or religious identity of
its own, but should allow its citizens to hold their own iden-
69. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South Africa
Courts: Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 479, 487 n.15 (1990).
70. This process, known as "gerrymandering," was found unconstitutional in
Reno v. Shaw, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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tities in a manner compatible with the state itself and with
each other. If a consociational arrangement can provide this
state identity, then it will achieve its desired stability. If the
concept of identity proves too great and divisive, then forces
may tend to rip the state asunder or to lead to the oppression
of a weak minority group.
III. NEO-SEPARATISM
There are, however, ways to achieve independence without
violence and without causing the state to rupture. The growth
of international trade has created intercourse among states
and the organizations and treaties necessary to manage that
intercourse."' It also has produced a great deal of harmoniza-
tion on a global scale. On the other side of the coin, however,
exists the administrative structure with which the states
themselves organize internally. In many countries, particularly
the most free-trading democratic ones, this has meant a trend
towards decentralization of power; devolution to the regions or
local governments., The traditional states, therefore, face a
double threat to their sovereignty: one from globalization and
one from decentralization. As the states themselves lose legiti-
macy, regional groups can capitalize on the situation. Without
having to agitate for independence, they can promote a new
political tactic, neo-separatism, by which they will achieve de
facto independence through democratic means.
A. Neo-Separatism in Catalonia
With its history of violent terrorism, the political situation
of the Basque Country receives much international focus when
social scientists consider Spain. Of vastly greater significance,
however, are the politics of Catalonia. There, the governing
nationalists have implanted a mode of operation which repre-
sents perhaps one of the greatest challenges to the notion of
the nation-state in the twenty-first century. The Catalan na-
tionalists have, in their two decades of government, produced a
finely-tuned agenda which serves as the example for national-
ist movements elsewhere. The governing Catalan nationalists
fall within the mainstream of Spanish politics, and have even
71. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700.
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propped up minority governments of the Socialist Party (1993-
1996) and the conservative Popular Party (1996-2000)." The
Autonomous Government of Catalonia, acting outside the scope
of the powers accorded to it by the Spanish Constitution, uses
much the same language as outright independentists when it
presses its nationalist demands. In their official capacity,
Catalan politicians have conducted their own foreign policy,
often in accordance with the principles of the United Nations
and the European Union.7" In doing so, they have more qui-
etly put forward the question as to exactly what Catalonia's
right to self-determination is and how the international com-
munity should acknowledge it.
The strategy of the Catalan government has great reper-
cussions internationally because it represents an alternative to
traditional independentist approaches. Technically, the
Catalan nationalists who govern Catalonia do not seek Catalan
independence from Spain. Instead, they seek to gain or enlarge
direct Catalan representation in international organizations to
which Spain itself is a party.74 In doing so they do not have to
go against Spanish laws or treaty obligations. At the same
time, however, they seek to strengthen these supra-national
organizations, such that the traditional member-states, like
Spain, lose some of their own flexibility in terms of these trea-
ty obligations. This activity delegitimizes the state. If regional
governments like that of Catalonia have direct representation
in these international organizations, then the states them-
selves lose relevance. Taken to an extreme, Catalonia would
obtain de facto independence without ever having to declare
that independence. This marks a shrewd deviation from tradi-
tional approaches. Their actions characterize a "neo-separat-
ism," a tendency which they hope will spread abroad to de-
legitimize the traditional states to the point where the Catalan
nationalists and their friends no longer need to separate to
gain effective independence.
Catalonia sits in the northeastern corner of the Iberian
Peninsula. Catalonia proper has nearly seven million inhabit-
72. In March 2000, the Popular Party won the general elections outright and
could form a majority government. Although the conservatives sought Catalan
nationalist support, such support was no longer necessary to govern.
73. See KELLAS, supra note 1, at 154.
74. See id.
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ants, although virtually a third of that population is made up
of immigrants from elsewhere in Spain who have moved to the
area around Barcelona for economic reasons.75 Two other
Spanish regions, Valencia and the Balearic Islands, are also
culturally and linguistically Catalan, although the quasi-feder-
al structure of the medieval Catalan empire allowed them to
grow as historically separate regions with their own distinct
identities. 6 In total, nearly eleven million Europeans, mostly
from Spain, speak Catalan and identify with some aspect of
Catalan culture, making Catalans more numerous than several
independent European nationalities, including, for example,
the Danes." In contrast with the notorious Basques, and even
with the non-violent groups such as the Scots in Britain, the
main Catalan nationalist politicians do not openly proclaim
that they want to renegotiate their relationship with the cen-
tral government. Catalan nationalist politicians have shown
greater pragmatism in gradually gaining concessions from
Madrid. If their strategy succeeds, they will never need to
openly declare independence. Indeed, they often deride
independentists, but independence will happen nonetheless.
Although these questions can appear as internal constitu-
tional issues, they have great impact on other countries as
well. As the model of the European Union takes hold, the in-
fluence of Jordi Pujol, Catalonia's nationalist president, on
other parts of the continent can serve to undermine the old
nation-states, which will take an increased interest in self-
preservation. The institutions of the European Union
themselves get crafted by the member-states, which is one
reason the Catalan government seeks direct representation
without which it must rely on Spain to represent its interests
in Europe, even if those interests conflict with the perceived
rights of Catalonia to self-determination. Other parts of the
world grapple with similar issues in the sphere of constitution-
al reform: should multi-ethnic states not decentralize, they run
the risk of contravening the United Nations by not acknowl-
edging the rights of their minorities to self-determination;
should they decentralize too much, however, they run the risk
75. See id. at 16-18.
76. See id.
77. See id.
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of having their now-autonomous minorities clamor for an inde-
pendent role in world affairs.
B. Self-Determination in Current International Law
Despite nationalists' visible protests to the contrary,
Catalonia's claim to self-determination is weak. The Charter of
the United Nations enshrined the right of self-determination
as a fundamental human right." Subsequent United Nations
declarations, however, have failed to clarify who could make
claims for self-determination and what would result of those
claims should the member state determine that the matter was
purely internal. The Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
spelled out that:
by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of people enshrined in the Charter, all peoples have the
right freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cul-
tural development, and every State has the duty to respect
this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter."
However, only paragraphs later, the Declaration added that:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismem-
ber or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or
political unity of sovereign and independent States conduct-
ing themselves in compliance with the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples as described above
and thus possessed of a government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to
race, creed or colour."
What this document does not address is a way to deter-
78. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
79. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, October 24, 1970, U.N. GAOR,
Supp. 121 (n.28), U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly
Relations].
80. Id.
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mine how much self-determination satisfactorily fulfills the
conditions set. The document fails to reconcile these two para-
graphs. The period in which the U.N. drafted the Declaration,
however, provides some context for resolution of this problem.
At the time, the world was witnessing massive decolonization.
Construed under these pretenses, the U.N.'s declarations on
self-determination are less about independentist movements
within countries than about anti-colonial movements in occu-
pied countries. That does not stop independentist movements
from making the same claim of rights. By delving into history,
these movements often argue that the colonization merely took
place centuries before and that, therefore, their cultures have
suffered more prolonged suppression. This lengthier discrimi-
nation, according to this theory, gives these claimants even
more right to self-determination.
Catalan nationalists use history to demonstrate centuries
of domination at the hands of Castilian Spain and, therefore,
to prove the long-standing validity of their claims for self-de-
termination.81 The record shows, however, that Catalonia was
one of the founding partners in the Spanish state, even if this
state was dominated since the beginning by Castile. 2 Fur-
thermore, Catalans had an important role in influencing the
current Spanish ConstitutionY Although some Catalanists
claim that Castile has treated Catalonia like a colony for most
of Spain's existence, this view is contentious. Indeed, industrial
Catalonia is the wealthiest region in Spain, although this has
meant that it also contributes the most money in taxes. Yet,
Catalonia often has been under-represented in Spanish poli-
tics. Whether this represents colonialism on the part of Castile
depends on interpretation.' Furthermore, even if Castile's
treatment of Catalonia did have colonialist tendencies in the
past, whether Catalonia is truly a colony under the current
constitutional structure also would require debate.
Scotland provides an enlightening comparison in this case.
Scottish nationalists filed their own "Claim of Right to Self-
81. For a general overview of Catalan history, see FELIPE FERNANDEZ-
ARMESTO, BARCELONA: A THOUSAND YEARS OF THE CITY'S PAST (1991).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Cf. Charles E. Ehrlich, The Lliga Regionalista and the Catalan Industrial
Bourgeoisie, 33 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 381, 399-417 (1998).
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Determination" with the United Nations in the 1970s, using
many of the same arguments Catalans would use in a 1997
claim."5 In the Scottish case, at least, Scotland could claim
that it had become an economic backwater under English rule.
However, it could submit no firm evidence that it would have
developed otherwise. Indeed, Scotland joined the Union in
order to gain access to the English, henceforward British, Em-
pire. The fact that Scotland's legal government entered into a
Union with England and Wales under legitimate law under-
mines any future claim to colonization - according even to
Scottish legal scholars who support independence - unless
Scotland could show discriminatory and overtly oppressive
government at the hands of the dominant English." A 1972
International Commission of Jurors decision, based on what
the Commission considered a widely held view among interna-
tional lawyers, stated that "if a people or their representatives
have once chosen to join.with others within a unitary or feder-
al state, that choice is the final exercise of their right to self-
determination; they cannot afterwards claim the right to se-
cede under the principle of the right to self-determination." 7
A negotiated divorce, such as what took place in Czechoslova-
kia, would carry more merit than a claim for self-determina-
tion before the UN. Catalonia, which has generally prospered
within Spain, has a similarly dubious legal claim in this view.
C. The Democratic Convergence of Catalonia: Interpreting the
Spanish Constitution
Since the restoration of autonomy for Catalonia under the
current constitution, one political party has dominated Catalan
politics: the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC). The
CDC was originally formed as a coalition of nationalist groups
85. On September 1, 1997, a Catalan nationalist group styling itself the
"Catalan National Council" formally submitted a petition to Kofi Annan, Secretary
General of the United Nations, for Catalonia's right to self-determination indepen-
dent of Spain (and France). Joan Lucas i Masjoan et al., The Catalan National
Council Requests and Demands, Officially and Urgently, Letter to Kofi Annan,
(Sept. 1997), available at http'J/www.cnc-cat.orglcnc-cat/soLa.htm.
86. See Elspeth Attwool, A Right to Secede? Scotland Reviewed, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND SOVEREIGNTY, 133-136 (Richard Bellamy ed.,
Avebury 1996).
87. Id. Attwool hinges the Scottish right to self-determination on an aspiration
to a greater degree of autonomy allowed for by the (British) democratic polity.
2000] 469
BROOK. J. INTL L.
of center-left and center-right (social democrats, Christian
democrats, and liberals).' Composing every government with
its perpetual coalition partner, the Democratic Union of
Catalonia (UDC, a Christian Democratic party which dates to
the 1930s), and together with the UDC forming at least an
overwhelming relative majority in the Catalan parliament
since autonomy, the CDC controls official policy within the
Catalan government. 9 The CDC's president, Jordi Pujol i
Soley, has served as President of Catalonia since 1980, and is
the most widely known voice for Catalonia throughout the
world. 0 As a result, the policies expressed by the CDC usu-
ally reappear as the policies of the Catalan government. The
CDC's mission statement concludes with a "Determination to
Exist," which states that:
[Ilt is today, in the framework of the future political union of
Europe that we Catalans say we want to participate directly,
with no intermediaries, as one more people among the peo-
ples of Europe. And for all these reasons that, for Catalonia,
we are asking the same right as the continent's other na-
tions: the right to exist, the right to freely and democratical-
ly, by exercising our right to self-government, decide our fu-
ture.91
Within the context of the Spanish state-structure, self-
government does not necessarily mean independence, however.
The Constitution of 1978 divided Spain into seventeen autono-
mous communities, based roughly on historic regions. The
"Catalan Question" was one of the fundamental questions with
which the framers of the Constitution had to deal.92 The Con-
stitution technically "recognized" the regions, rather than "con-
stitute" them, thus acknowledging their historic right to auton-
omy.93 However, the Constitution also spoke of the unity of
the Spanish State, in the process denying any right to self-
88. Convergdncia Democrdtica de Catalunya, A determination to exist, at
http'//www.convergencia.org/llengues/english/determation.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2000).
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. GREGORIO PECES-BARBA MARTINEZ, LA ELABORAC16N DE LA CONSTITUCI6N
DE 1978 22-23 (Fernando Torres ed., 1988).
93. Id.
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determination in the traditional sense of sovereignty. 4 The
arrangement was meant to allow each region or "nationality"
autonomy and local self-government within the Spanish state.
As a trade-off, the principle of "self-determination" was applied
to the Spanish state in its entirety. As a democratic country,
Spain was providing self-determination to all of its peoples,
especially in as far as it allowed regional self-government."
Within the Spanish Constitution of 1978, the State was para-
mount and controlled the distribution of power to the regions,
however.96 The representative of the Spanish Socialist Work-
ers Party on the commission which wrote the Constitution, the
legal scholar Gregorio Peces-Barba Martinez, assured the con-
gressional committee which oversaw his commission that the
right of self-determination specifically mentioned in the United
Nations Declaration would not interfere with this constitution-
al construction which recognized "nationalities" within Spain.
He claimed the right was only applicable to colonized peoples
and not to peoples which had, over history, united with others
into states.7
Although one of the CDC's leading intellectuals, Miquel
Roca Junyent, had a seat on the committee which wrote the
Constitution, the CDC in practice has rejected the con-
struction. The current Secretary General of the CDC, Pere
Esteve, has explained that "nevertheless, the notable ambigu-
ity of some points and key phrases in the Constitution at the
moment of definition, for example, of how much the self-gov-
ernment of Catalonia should encompass, leaves too much to
the arbitrariness of (central) political power."" Esteve has
objected to the division of Spain into seventeen autonomous
communities, some based on historic nationalities and some
not, which though they have differing levels of autonomy are
essentially, in Esteve's opinion, symmetrical entities which
94. See LuIS SANCHEZ AGESTA, SISTEMA POLITICO DE LA CONSTIrUCI6N
ESPAOLA DE 1978 397-399 (1993).
95. See Herrero Rodriguez de Minon, Speech in Congress, (May 5, 1978), re-
printed in CONSTITUCI6N ESPANOLA: TRABAJOS PARLAMENTARIOS 639 (Fernando
Sainz Moreno ed., 1980).
96. See PECES-BARBA, LA CONSTrrUCION ESPANOLA DE 1978 330 (1981) (citing
his own statements of June 16, 1978).
97. See id.
98. See generally PERE ESTEVE, PER UN NOU HORITZ6 PER A CATALUNYA
(1997).
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dilute the uniqueness of the historic nationalities.99 Objecting
to both the "sane regionalism" of the Spanish right (in govern-
ment since May 1996) and the "homogenizing formulas" of the
Spanish socialists (in government from 1982 to 1996), Esteve
has argued for a broad interpretation of self-government.' 0
The policy of the CDC, and therefore of the Catalan gov-
ernment, thus has been to seek to expand the powers of
Catalonia.'0 ' In doing so, it has been careful to keep its offi-
cial demands within the confines of the Spanish State. The
CDC does not operate as an independentist party. It has in-
stead collaborated with the central government in order to win
greater concessions for Catalonia and to expand Catalan au-
tonomy beyond the scope envisioned by the Constitution. At
times this has been of dubious constitutionality, but that is
hardly an international concern." 2
One power most definitely not granted by the Constitution
to the autonomous communities, however, was control over
foreign policy. This has not stopped the government of
Catalonia from pursuing an increasingly vociferous presence in
the world community. The most visible campaign occurred in a
massive advertising blitz during the Barcelona Olympics of
1992, when the Autonomous Government took out double full-
page advertisements in major international publications. "In
which country would you place this city," the first page asked,
showing a blank map of Europe with a dot marked Barcelona.
The next page showed the same map, with the borders of
Catalonia drawn around Barcelona: "In Catalonia, a country in
Spain."103 Pujol himself makes frequent trips abroad under
the guise of cultural exchanges, something permitted to him
under the Constitution. Yet, on these trips he often meets with
foreign governments to discuss trade, immigration, environ-
mental policy, and other geo-political problems. Further, he
brings with him members of his cabinet, who meet with corre-
sponding members of foreign governments.
As countries in the old Soviet sphere gained independence
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Pere Esteve, La maduressa del Catalanisme, at http'//convergencia.org/par-
tit/catalanisme2.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2000).
103. JOHN HARGREAVES, FREEDOM FOR CATALONIA? CATALAN NATIONALISM,
SPANISH IDENTITY, AND THE BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES 85-86 (2000)
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in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pujol welcomed their new
leaders to Barcelona on official state visits. Pujol also had no
problems accepting invitations to the newly-independent
states. When Pujol visited Slovakia after its split from the
Czech Republic, the Slovaks welcomed him by flying the
Catalan flag and playing the Catalan anthem alongside their
Slovak counterparts. Even at home that flag and anthem ap-
pear with prominence. At the Barcelona Olympics in 1992, for
which Catalan nationalists applied to the International Olym-
pic Committee to send their own team, the organizers found
they had to fly the Catalan flag and play the Catalan anthem
at the opening ceremonies in order to avoid the hissing that
accompanied the Spanish equivalents at the rehearsals (and
Spanish King Juan Carlos found himself introduced with a
Catalanized name and fictitious title: "Joan Carles, Rei de
Catalunya"). These traditional symbols, though theoretically
harmless, carry much importance in the perception of
Catalonia as an entity on the international stage."4
The stated policies of the CDC have as an object to "trans-
fer onto the international and European scene the effects de-
rived from the enlargement of [Catalan] political power and
the recognition [of Catalonia] as a nation, by distinguishing the
country through its international presence." 5 This includes:
debating international policy within Catalan political organ-
isms to the extent they would occupy within any sovereign
state, encouraging cultural and economic exchanges with other
states, promoting Barcelona as a geopolitical center, developing
foreign relations, achieving representation for Catalonia on
international institutional bodies, and obtaining full represen-
tation within the European Union.0 6 As the governing party
within Catalonia, the CDC under Pujol has begun to put these
goals into practice.
Although Pujol is quick and loud to defend Catalan inter-
ests, his strategy is subtle. He talks of using Catalonia as the
catalyst to develop Spain. What he fundamentally recognizes is
that, in the world today, an independent Catalonia would nev-
104. For a discussion of the political use of symbols at the Barcelona Olympics,
and especially "Catalanization" of the Games, see JOHN HARGREAVES, supra note
104, at 58-95.
105. Esteve, supra note 98.
106. See Esteve, supra note 102.
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er be truly independent. A prudent Catalonia would retain its
links to Spain. A wealthy and developed Spain would remain
an important neighbor.
Pujol has found the greatest success within the sphere of
the European Union. The European Union has provided a way
to justify nationalist demands without seeming extremist and
indeed by often supporting the greater state. Importantly, the
CDC does not call itself a "nationalist" party. Although it
speaks of the "nation" within Catalonia, it seeks compromise
and moderation on the Spanish political scene as a means of
winning power from the center.! 7 The CDC has proposed
Catalanism as the force that could carry Spain into Europe; if
Spain did not want to come along, Catalonia would go alone
into the European mainstream. Spain, in this view, was a
myth created by Castile; its peoples really belonged to Eu-
rope.0 8 As Spain entered the European Community, Catalan
nationalism grew in stature within Catalonia as a European
movement.'o9
Pujol has also taken an active role in the Assembly of
European Regions, of which he has served as President since
1992.110 The "Europe of the Regions" movement has sought to
redefine the European Union by recognizing the continent as
an assemblage of peoples and historic regions which could form
the basis of a new Euro-federation."' However, when the Eu-
ropean Movement has talked of "regionalism" it has ignored
the traditional variety concerned with ethnic, cultural, and
linguistic matters - often of prime importance to the Europe of
the Regions movement - in favor of "functional" regionalism, an
economic and social cousin described in Article Two of the
Rome Treaty"' and promoted by regional policy, leveling dif-
ferences, and homogenizing regions, rather than fostering di-
107. See JORDI SOLt TURA, NAcIONALIDADES Y NACIONALISMOS EN ESPANA:
AUTONOMIAS, FEDERALISMO, AUTO-DETERMINACI6N 57 (1973).
108. LEANDRE COLOMER I CALSINA, CATALUNYA I EL FEDERALISME 193 (1991).
109. Felip Puig i Godes, Tot compromis comporta risc, CONVERGENCIA
INFoRMAcIM EDICI6 ELECTR6NICA (Oct. 6, 1997) at http'J/convergencia.orginform-
acio/numanteriors.html.
110. See Fried Esterbauer, Die Regionalistische Leitstze, in FODERALISMUS UND
REGIONALISMUS IN EUROPAISCHER PERSPEKTIVE 78 (Stefan Huber and Peter
Perathaler, eds., 1988).
111. See id.
112. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 2 [hereinafter Rome Treaty].
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versity."' "Catalonia," Pujol has said speaking for many his-
toric micro-nationalities, "does not aspire to be a North Dako-
ta.""4 Some "regions" have more value than others.1 ' Nev-
ertheless, men like Pujol often have pressed European region-
alism for its economic rather than its cultural role. Pujol's
Catalonia has been as happy to collaborate with recent admin-
istrative creations like Rhone-Alpes and Baden-Wfirttemberg
as with traditional cultural regions with strong industrial
bases like Lombardy."6
The CDC has succeeded in Catalonia to a great degree due
to Pujol's multi-faceted character. In Barcelona he talks of
nationalism. In Madrid, he seeks power at the level of the
Spanish state, professing Catalonia's interest in Spain. In Eu-
rope, he aspires to lead the regional representation he hopes to
win in Brussels, even while he complains that such representa-
tion for all regions downplays the importance of those regions
that have their own "national" identity as opposed to those
which were mere administrative creations.
Pujol's policies have indeed increased awareness of
Catalonia abroad. However, they have not done much to clarify
recognition of the right to self-determination. Spain in no way
violates the conditions set in the U.N.'s Declaration on Princi-
ples regarding compliance with the principle of equal rights
and self-determination." 7 Indeed, a majority of Catalans do
not desire complete independence from Spain and find ample
expression for their political views - even nationalist ones -
within the democratic framework of Spain. Therefore, Spain
could rely on the international community to support it in
defending itself from a bid by Catalan nationalists to under-
mine the State. Should Spain so desire, it could put pressure
on the international community to cease recognizing Pujol's
foreign policy and to stop high-level meetings with the Catalan
President."8
113. See generally Jules Vandamme, Regionalism in Europe, in REGIONALISM
AND SUPRA-NATIONALISM (D.M. Cameron ed., 1981).
114. FEDERALISMO Y ESTADO DE LAS AUTONOMfAS 115 (Llufs Armet ed., 1988).
115. See id.
116. See CHRISTOPHER HARVIE, THE RISE OF REGIONAL EUROPE 53-64 (1994).
117. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 79.
118. The same sorts of questions make themselves apparent in international
dealings with the Tibetan and Taiwanese governments. Starting with a United Na-
tions Resolution in 1959 calling for "respect for the fundamental human rights of
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Spain has not pursued this option, though this likely has
to do with internal political instability and the need for recent
minority governments (the last Socialist government and the
current conservative one) to rely on the Catalan nationalists
for the support that keeps them in power. However, comple-
mentary to the question of what exactly is Catalonia's right to
"self-determination," is the question of what rights Spain has
against Catalan governmental activities within the interna-
tional community.
The U.N. Declaration may not explain itself clearly, but
the context in which the General Assembly approved it and
principles of customary international law leave little doubt
that Catalonia has a very weak claim to self-determination. To
assert a claim of self-determination based on the United Na-
tions Declaration, Catalonia would have to show that it had
been the victim of colonization, or barring that, of severe cur-
the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life," several
countries and international bodies have passed resolutions in support of the Dalai
Lama's government-in-exile and condemning the Chinese occupation of Tibet. (A
comprehensive summary of international resolutions on Tibet is available at
http://www.tibet.com/Resolution/index.html). Different countries have welcomed the
Dalai Lama on state visits, and several states have also begun to appoint coor-
dinators for Tibetan affairs within the auspices of their departments of state. See,
e.g., Austl. Sen. Res. (Nov. 24, 1997) (supporting a similar U.S. measure), available
at http/www.tibet.com/Resolution/aus24nov97.html. China has repeatedly objected
to this quasi-recognition, and the clout of the Chinese government has been the
main obstacle towards full recognition of Tibet. Likewise, albeit under distinct
circumstances, the Chinese government has also blocked full international recogni-
tion of Taiwan due to its territorial claims. Taiwan, as a major international eco-
nomic trading power, has become increasingly frustrated with this state of affairs,
and has begun to pursue its own quest for recognition. While official Taiwanese
policy under the long-governing Nationalists had always been for the recognition of
only one "Chinese" government, trends suggested the emergence of a dual-recogni-
tion policy even among the Nationalists. See Formosan Association of Public Af-
fairs, The dual recognition of China and Taiwan, DUAL RECOGNITION (June 3,
1997). Then, in March 2000, a pro-independence party dethroned the nationalists,
raising this issue to yet another level. China continues to protest, however, when-
ever any country receives Taiwanese diplomats.
But the human rights issues in China present a more clear-cut case in
breach of the UN Declaration of Principles in the case of Tibet. Quasi-recognition
of Tibet and Taiwan gives the international community leverage when dealing
with China on other issues. In the case of Spain, however, these issues do not
present themselves. The Spanish government, therefore, would find itself in a
much stronger position should it choose to demand that the international commu-
nity cease contacts with the Catalan government beyond those approved by Spain
under its constitution.
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rent oppression.19 The Catalans already have self-determina-
tion within the Spanish State. Spain is a democratic country in
which Catalans have full and equal rights. Catalonia joined
Castile as a partner in Spain over five centuries ago through
legitimate means. Although since then Spain has increasingly
imposed itself on the administration of Catalonia, and Catalan
language and culture have been banned for periods, Catalonia
today enjoys autonomy within Spain, under a Constitution that
was written by seven respected legal scholars, two of whom
were Catalans. Catalan nationalists regularly win elections
within Catalonia to govern Catalonia and to represent
Catalonia in Madrid.12 Despite the dubious constitutionality
of their actions, Catalan leaders regularly conduct foreign
policy without protest from Madrid. 2' Although many
Catalans may not be entirely happy with the level of autonomy
granted to Catalonia under the current constitutional regime,
they are able to, and do indeed, affect change through constitu-
tional and democratic means. The United Nations Charter
sanctifies existing states except under extreme scenarios; if
Catalonia cannot meet these scenarios, Catalan nationalists
must find another means to achieve their goal of self-determi-
nation independent of the Spanish State. The neo-separatist
path they have chosen cleverly circumvents the issue, but still
could have the same result.
D. Globalization and Decentralization: Economic Determinants
The issue of globalization is not a new one. When the
modern nation-states formed in the West, they did so because
of world-wide trading pressures. Sovereignty needed to reside
in that structure which could best represent the interests of
the elites, and so that sovereignty gradually passed from mon-
archs to some element of the states themselves. In most cases,
this transfer meant finding the right balance of power within
each state between the aristocracy and the growing burgher
classes as well as, in some cases, military interests. The Unit-
ed States made the distinct innovation of transferring sover-
119. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 79.
120. See KELLAS, supra note 1, at 89.
121. See id.
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eignty to the people.'22 But whatever the system used, inter-
national relations meant relations between distinct states
rather than between traditional rulers.
The new paradigm did not represent a complete shift,
however, because it happened in response to global pressures
and merely represented a new and improved way of dealing
with those pressures. The further shifts which have occurred
since the Second World War or since the early 1970s have
merely represented the latest development in this trend. Even
statists who see the state as the cornerstone of human exis-
tence have seen that same state as part of a state-system;
which itself forms a natural supra-state organization reflected
in international law.' Although sovereign states still retain
the right not to participate in international accords, in practice
they find they have to conform eventually, to some degree,
with world legal norms because they are enmeshed in a web of
interdependencies and have to take the rest of the world com-
munity into account to accomplish their own interests. 24 Fur-
ther, in international law, states gradually begin to conform to
the standards of the world community, even if those standards
themselves gradually change over time. For those who argue
for the primacy of the state, only a small step exists between
internationalism and intra-state collaboration within a supra-
state organization."
As a result, states find they must recognize certain human
rights in order to fully participate in the global system. If they
fail to, the international pressure often comes with an econom-
ic impact. If states decentralize power, or if smaller adminis-
122. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST.
123. See Alain Lipietz, The National and the Regional: Their Autonomy Vis-a-
Vis the Capitalist World Crisis, in TRANSCENDING THE STATE-GLOBAL DIVIDE: A
NEO-STRUCTURALIST AGENDA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 23-24 (Ronen P. Palan
& Barry Gills eds., 1994).
124. See Mark W. Zacher, The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Im-
plications for International Order and Governance, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOV-
ERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 60 (James N. Rosenau &
Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., Cambridge 1992); Anthony J.N. Judge & Kiell
Skjelsbaek, Transnational Associations and Their Functions, in FUNCTIONALISM:
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 203-204 (A.J.R. Groom &
Paul Taylor eds., 1975).
125. See A.J.R. Groom, Functionalism and World Society, in FUNCTIONALISM:
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 94-96 (A.J.R. Groom & Paul
Taylor eds., 1975).
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trative units gain independence, those new units themselves
become locked into the global system to a greater rather than
lesser extent. International politics and economics have blend-
ed. Economic decisions are often political ones. When heads of
state meet, they most often discuss economic exchanges be-
tween their countries. Political conferences focus on trade is-
sues. Even conventions on human rights or the environment
wrap themselves in the economic bottom line. And the bottom
line remains that free trade increases wealth. Nationalist de-
mands by some states still hinder many agreements, but more
and more barriers to trade break down daily. Even many of the
most closed-minded opponents to free trade still argue their
own economic theories to justify their politics.
Independence for sub-state political regions only makes
economic sense as long as the seceding state recognizes its
place in the global world. Independence for independence's
sake may address a political desire for self-determination, but
if the new state hopes to succeed, the decision cannot simply
exist in the political sphere. Levels of technology, travel, and
general interaction between peoples have been increasing expo-
nentially. The number of interactions and common concerns
and processes to deal with them has increased, leading to ever
more common processes and international organizations to
manage those processes.'26 Increasingly, states find they
must become involved in international bodies in order to fur-
ther global interests, because only in that way can they protect
their own interests.'27
In the contemporary world, economic well-being has be-
come as important as security, if it has not already entirely
surpassed security as the primary issue of international rela-
tions. The increase in trade has resulted in the demise of
armed powers facing each other down over traditional sover-
eign issues and the rise of collaboration in trade for mutual
wealth creation. 2 ' Where theories of international relations
once concerned themselves with solely state actors, they now
involve the examination of underlying and overlying processes,
movements, and concerns - the structure of the global sys-
126. See ANDREW M. SCOTT, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE 54-55 (1982).
127. See id. at 132-134.
128. Czempiel, Governance and Democratization, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT Gov-
ERNMENT 172 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
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tem.
129
One important issue which has surfaced threatens the
very structure of the traditional states from within: the ques-
tion of which geographic boundaries might best deal with local
neds and represent and administer the local population. The
boundaries in question might subdivide the existing states, or
might encompass parts of more than one state. They might
correspond to the rising tide of nationalist movements, or they
might follow a purely functionalist approach in which each
problem needing a solution required the ad hoc formation of a
different geographic community for every given scenario. 3 '
Within many democratic countries, which are often also
those most open to international free-trading schemes, the
tendency in recent years has been to decentralize the adminis-
tration even while passing control of global issues to interna-
tional organizations. Within the global framework, traditional
states have less meaning. It becomes possible, even for
independentist nationalist movements, to argue that not only
are they not destructive forces aiming to break up states, but
that they are in reality constructive forces, better suited to
participate in global affairs. Whichever way the boundaries
question resolves under any given circumstances, a growing
trend has emerged to consider people whom do not correspond
to the traditional states. This process has earned the descrip-
tion "building down," crafting statelets at more local levels
which might form within the constricts of international agree-
ments."3 ' Thus, the Scottish National Party can campaign for
"Independence in Europe" and participate with numerous other
regional movements within the European movement.132 The
Catalan nationalists, Europe's leaders in this philosophy, also
argue that their country does not require Madrid, but should
directly affiliate to international organizations even if
129. Gills & Palan, Introduction: the neostructuralist agenda in international
relations, in TRANSCENDING THE STATE-GLOBAL DIVIDE 1-8 (Ronen P. Palan &
Barry Gills eds., 1994).
130. See Paul Taylor, Regionalism: The Thought and the Deed, in FRAMEWORKS
FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 151-152 (Groom & Taylor eds., 1990).
131. Alexis Heraclides, From Autonomy to Secession: Building Down, in FRAI lE-
WORKS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 194 (Groom & Taylor eds., 1990).
132. Charles E. Ehrlich, Federalism, Regionalism, Nationalism: A Century of
Catalan Political Thought and its Implications for Scotland in Europe, in I SPACE
& POLITY 205, 220 (1997); D. McCrone, Post-Nationalism and the Decline of the
Nation-State, RADICAL SCOT. FeblMar. 1991, at 8.
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Catalonia remains part of Spain.' All of these movements
argue that the size of the state is no indication of its viability
in the modern world. Indeed, some attempts to create or main-
tain larger states are not viable because they cannot take into
account the interests of diverse populations.' It is, there-
fore, no contradiction that the global structure has tended both
towards interdependent globalization and local decentraliza-
tion.
The federal system in the United States offers one model.
The federal government has primacy in international treaties,
but each state may maintain its own policies where they do not
conflict with federal law.'35 Further down the structure, local
governments in the U.S. find that they too can enact economic
policy with contacts at various levels on the international trad-
ing system. When global economic forces affect local jurisdic-
tions, the relevant level of local government kicks in, often
bypassing the federal state completely. When the Republic was
founded, international trade had less of a pervasive effect lo-
cally; regulation from the federal government was sufficient. In
the modern world that is not the case. The division of compe-
tencies between the various levels of government means that
state and local governments which carry out their own global
economic policies are not overstepping their constitutional
bounds. 3 '
Within the new world economic order, populations seek a
voice which manifests itself on the local level. The more decen-
tralized the administration of a government, the more efficient-
ly it can address local needs. As a result, many states have
embarked on decentralization of administration in order to
strengthen their global positions. This decentralization serves
to fortify the parts, which in turn gives the entire state a com-
petitive boost in the global arena. But the states do this at
their own risk; they lose control over areas of their sovereignty,
both to the decentralized regions and to the international orga-
nizations. 37 The traditional concept of sovereignty loses its
133. See Ehrlich, supra note 132, at 220.
134. See Heraclides, supra note 131, at 185.
135. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
136. See Brenda S. Beerman, State Involvement in the Promotion of Export
Trade: Is It Time to Rethink the Concept of Federalism as it Pertains to Foreign
Relations? 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 187, 188 (1996).
137. Rosenau, Citizenship in a changing order, in GOVERNANCE WTHoUT GOV-
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role. If sovereignty is the measure for the state, then the state
has ceased to be as important a player in world affairs. But if
adapting to globalization for the benefit of the citizenry is the
measure, then the states which function most efficiently within
the new framework are actually maintaining their important
role as the protectors of their own societies.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the world enters the twenty-first century, the tradition-
al states are undergoing a massive identity crisis. The global
world has put one set of pressures on them; both in terms of
their place in the world and in terms of the behavior the world
expects states to follow, even when dealing exclusively with
their own citizens. On the other hand, component groups with-
in their borders have continued to strive for self-determination
and for their own cultural identities, often in tandem with the
new globalizing tendencies. As a result, the potential for seri-
ous conflict between different groups exists as much as ever.
Some states have entered convulsions. Others have looked
for ways to adapt to the changed global circumstances. Non-
peaceful and non-democratic solutions risk the traditional
state's position within the world. Not only is the trouble dis-
ruptive, and the international opprobrium quick to arrive, but
the state still has not addressed the root problem: the exis-
tence of diverse ethno-cultural groups within its boundaries.
If the different groups live in more-or-less defined areas,
then the devolution of administration can provide sufficient
self-determination to meet democratic desires and internation-
al norms. When combined with global pressures, such devolu-
tion ultimately may lead to separation, but the region which
may eventually separate from the traditional state still would
not get to separate from the world and still would have the old
state as a neighbor and necessary partner. Nationalist groups,
the "neo-separatists," which recognize this, will find them-
selves best placed to take advantage of both local and global
politics and economics. Governments of the traditional states
will see less threat in such nationalists.
Where the distinct groups live in mixed or intertwined
communities, however, a clear separation may not work. Devo-
ERNMENT 280-285 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
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lution of power may work in such situations as well, to allow a
more local say for regional concerns. But within each level of
government some form of consociationalism might work in-
stead to create a common civic society out of a number of dis-
tinct groups, a society in which no group feels threatened and
still maintains a modicum of control over its own affairs. The
drawback here is the question of whether a consociational
democracy would be sustainable, and if it were, whether it
would have to turn into an administrative bureaucracy in
order to work effectively.
The fundamental issue, however, remains that in a rapidly
changing world, in which the traditional states and civic iden-
tities find themselves under stress from several angles, those
states find themselves revisiting the issues of what to do with
their minority groups. Because of the increased prominence of
human rights and its role in international law and diplomacy,
the pressure exists to encourage the states to look for peaceful
and democratic solutions. Furthermore, the states find that
such peaceful and democratic solutions are not only less dis-
ruptive to the state's position in the global economy than more
violent or oppressive methods, but that the peaceful and demo-
cratic methods might actually make the sovereign state more
competitive and able to benefit from the international system.
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